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COVID-19 and 9/11: 
The Effect of Emotion on Reflection and Partisanship During Crises 
 
 The study of political psychology, through its incorporation of established principles of 
the field of psychology into politics, has transformed the standard political literature which 
supposes a moral foundation for constituent behavior and action.1 Decisions about which party, 
ideology, or candidate to adopt have, for years, been thought to have been chosen to align with 
the inherent beliefs of an individual.2 However, as the field of political psychology expands, 
questions are being raised about what truly lies beneath the decisions people make within the 
political realm and whether or not they can change or be influenced by outside factors.3  
 One of the most important contributions to this growing field is the idea of reflection. 
This mental process builds on the cognitive division established by psychologist such as Daniel 
Kahneman in his investigative book, Thinking Fast and Slow. In this understanding of cognition, 
an individual’s thought process is broken down into System 1––automatic intuitive reaction, and 
System 2––deeper analytical thought.4 System 1 relies on socially and relationally ingrained 
intuitive opinions and preferences formed outside the confines of conscious thought, known as 
implicit biases.5 Reflection, on the other hand, is the process in which an individual surpasses 
System 1 intuition and, instead, engages in the slower System 2 cognitive process of deliberation 
and reasoning.6 How does this apply to the standard thought of morally driven political actions? 
Are constituents––when presented with new information––capable of reformulating their 
opinions based on this information? Is the public beholden to implicit bias, or can it overcome 
gut-reaction and socially ingrained thought through a cognitive process of understanding, 
analyzing, and incorporating data?  
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Kevin Arceneaux and Ryan J. Vander Wielen argue people can and make significant 
strides in the application of the concept of reflection to politics, as they show certain individual 
characteristics can enhance the likelihood of reflection during political decision-making.7 They 
not only make important distinctions in who engages in reflection, but the level to which it 
occurs. Within System 2, Arceneaux & Vander Wielen break cognition into two further levels: 
algorithmic and reflective processes.8 The former demonstrates intellectual capabilities akin to 
IQ, while the latter implies a desire to critically engage with information, regardless of natural 
intellect.9 While a select few will engage at the highest level––reflection––most will default to 
implicit bias or utilize and manipulate new information to confirm previous belief, known as 
confirmation bias––a process they deem to be within System 1.10 During this reflection, emotion 
functions as an underlying System 1–– or subconscious––force which perpetuates reliance on 
implicit bias.11 As such, in order to overcome implicit and confirmation bias, one must also look 
past reactionary emotions and engage with political situations in an unbiased manner.12 This 
latter process of potential change of opinion due to reflection is of particular interest within the 
field of political psychology, as it proposes a way to break free from the steady increase in 
partisanship and extremism seen within American politics in recent years.13 
However, what this approach fails to recognize is the intersectional role emotion plays in 
both System 1 and 2 processes, and the potential effect it can have on reflection.14 In fact, the 
separation of emotion from cognitive thought which permeates both political and psychological 
literature may not hold as much weight as previously thought considering recent studies. New 
research into the role of emotion in cognition demonstrates that the former transcends system 
boundaries. Instead of operating as an indicator (or not) for further, independent analysis, 
research shows emotion works in tandem with cognitive thought to produce a holistic and 
2
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intertwined assessment of situations. As such, emotion plays an integral role in subjective 
perception, not solely a reaction to an established fact.15 Furthermore, these studies argue that the 
division of brain functions into affective (emotional driven) and cognitive implies a flawed 
understanding of the interconnected operations of emotion and cognitive processing. They do not 
operate within two distinct systems, but instead work together to formulate behavior and 
thought.16  
Glimpses of this interconnectivity of the systems can be seen in Kahneman’s research on 
memory and mood. He shows how memory, while being an active part of the intuitive System 1, 
can be transformed into a slower, more deliberate System 2 process when indexing for 
information.17 In the same way one can rely on memory to make informed decisions, a person 
uses emotion as a means of deciding whether or not deeper analysis of a situation is necessary. 
Why, then, do we not apply the same transient premise to emotion, a similarly interwoven 
cognitive process? Studies have demonstrated how different moods affect how conclusions are 
drawn and what system is activated. When experiencing positive affect, a person more readily 
accepts intuition and, when faced with an objective question, is more likely to be correct in their 
intuitive answer. Conversely, negative affect causes a person to struggle to make accurate 
intuitive assumptions and necessitates the involvement of System 2.18 This intentional degree of 
thinking allows for deeper assessment instigated by negative feelings such as doubt and threat 
which cause hesitancy in decision-making.19 Accepting emotion as an equally complex and 
entangled factor in cognitive processing is a necessary step in understanding the psychology of 
decision-making.  
Taking this new psychological understanding of the interaction between emotion and 
cognition and applying it to political situations is crucial for the development of a modern and 
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accurate study of constituent thought and participation in politics. Through experimental data, 
this paper argues that emotion is a significant factor in how people approach and reflect on 
political situations. It aims to demonstrate how emotions, instead of only operating on a 
subconscious System 1 level driving implicit bias, can instigate or function in tandem with 
reflection within both subsections of System 2 reasoning and cognitive thought. Furthermore, it 
aims to reposition Arceneaux & Vander Wielen’s System 1 level confirmation bias within 
System 2, as––despite reaffirming previous beliefs––it shows engagement with new information 
that changes how one views political situations and decision-making. Particularly, by performing 
research on constituent emotional response, identity affiliation, and approval of political leaders 
during times of national crises, this is an investigation into the role emotion––particularly anxiety 
and threat––plays in not only reflection but also partisanship. The hypothesis is that when 
confronted with a national crisis, people will experience increased feelings of anxiety and threat, 
leading to a departure from personal partisan identification in favor of a broader national 
identity. Reflection during times of crises will correlate with emotional response to leadership 
and the effects the conditions have on an individual’s life.  
Through statistical analysis of the survey data collected, this paper demonstrates support 
for the hypothesis that emotions play a significant role in reflection––specifically confirmation 
bias. The results show that emotions, particularly feelings of calm and safety, correlate with 
lower levels of reflection while anxiety and threat are associated with higher levels of reflection. 
These results support previous findings of the distinctive roles of positive and negative affect in 
cognitive thought. Additionally, the tests indicate an intersection between the effect of emotion 
and partisanship on reflection among the public. This paper exposes the importance of the effect 
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emotions can have on constituency and elite behavior alike, shedding light on the importance of 
the underdeveloped area in political psychology and necessity for further research.  
Research Design 
The purpose of this research is to demonstrate the role of emotion in reflection and 
partisanship during times of national crisis. The research conducted focuses on two of the most 
emotionally, physically, and politically impactful crises the US has faced in the past two 
decades: COVID-19 and 9/11.20 The decision to study times of crises in US history was based on 
the findings that reflection can be instigated in unprecedented scenarios, when the default System 
1 provides no benefit and one must critically evaluate the situation, as he/she cannot rely on 
intuitive understanding and the resultant autonomous behavior.21 The goal of conducting 
research during the onset of the COVID-19 outbreak is to survey the population in the midst of a 
time of heightened emotion due to the uncertainty as to what exactly causes the virus, who it 
most affects, and how to stop it. Given the lack of scientific understanding during the first couple 
months of the pandemic, the hypothesis is that this uncertainty will, in turn, cause heightened 
anxiety and a sense of threat.22 Additionally, repeating the survey questions in reference to 9/11 
serves to compare the event and emotions to another national crisis, but, instead, one that ignited 
fear and anxiety over a known threat and specific outlet and culprit for such emotions.23 
Moreover, the comparison and contrast of these two events has the potential to expose the role of 
memory in future emotionally-driven political evaluations.24 Considering established evidence of 
memory’s involvement in System 2 level analysis, this study investigates how associated 
emotions change or heighten that role.25 Specifically of interest, is the phenomenon of 
“emotional enhancement of memory” where recall of emotionally-based memories is stronger 
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than that of non-emotional events and is defined by heightened subjectivity, rather than 
precision.26 
By cross-examining unfamiliar events and the emotional and political responses to them, 
this study investigates the important, yet understudied, role of emotions in constituents' political 
evaluations. This paper outlines the findings for the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: The emotion one feels during COVID-19 and 9/11 will affect one’s 
likelihood to engage in System 2 reflection.  
The first hypothesis brings together the recent research in psychology, revealing that 
emotion operates outside the established systems and interacts with cognitive processes, and 
political research on selective constituent reflection.27 By recognizing the cognitive role of 
emotion, this hypothesis aims to demonstrate how the two work together to formulate political 
opinions. More specifically, it suggests feelings of anxiety and threat will increase during crisis, 
and that those who feel these emotions will be more likely to reflect, as these emotions are more 
consistently tied to unfamiliar situations.28 Further, due to a lack of instability and a 
comfortability with a current situation, it can be hypothesized that those who feel positive 
emotion/affect in the midst of the crisis will have less reason to reflect or change their opinion of 
political leaders.  
Hypothesis 2: Partisanship will decrease when threat and anxiety increase during times 
of crisis.  
Supposing support for Hypothesis 1, if threat and anxiety increase during times of crisis, 
partisanship will decrease. This hypothesis assumes a negative correlation between partisanship 
and feelings of threat and anxiety. When faced with a collective crisis where the biggest source 
of threat and anxiety is perceived to come from outside the confines of the nation, in-group/out-
groups will be reformulated, in which people will be more likely to identify with their nationality 
over party affiliation.29 As a result of this transition, they will look less to party cues and 
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partisanship will go down.30 Specifically, one can expect to see a slight difference in results 
between COVID-19 and 9/11, as the threat/anxiety manifested itself in a clear out-group (foreign 
terrorists) during 9/11 than during the biological threat of COVID-19. The physical 
manifestation of threat/anxiety in a foreign body will have clarified the prioritized out-group, and 
result in increased nationalism and decreased party-based out-groups during 9/11. However, 
during COVID-19, due to multiple proposed sources of threat and anxiety, there will be an 
inability to pinpoint one as specifically as in 9/11, and the in-group/out-group will undergo a less 
dramatic shift.31 Party lines will be crossed less frequently and partisanship will decrease, but 
only slightly, leaving constituents to continue to rely on party cues which will affect reflection.   
Hypothesis 3: Memory of 9/11 will affect one’s emotional response to national crises. 
The ability to use memory recall during COVID-19 will affect one’s likelihood to reflect. 
Specifically, those who experienced 9/11 will look to comparative memory to reflect on COVID-
19, resulting in decreased feelings of threat and anxiety as compared to 9/11. This will be 
apparent more generally, in that older constituents will be less likely to feel threatened by 
COVID-19 when compared to 9/11.  
Methods  
To conduct this research, GoogleForms was utilized to create a 26-question anonymous 
survey dispersed on various social media sites and through virtual interaction during April and 
May of 2020 (survey questions found in Appendix I). The final data consisted of 288 
respondents, spanning different genders (61.5 percent female; 36.8 percent male; 1.7 percent 
other), ages (49.7 percent between 20-29yo; 17 percent 30-39; 13.5 percent 40-49; 7.6 percent 
under 20; 7.6 percent 50-59; 6.3 percent 60 or older), education levels (35.8 percent with B.A.s; 
28.5 percent completed some college; 19.1 percent with Ph,Ds; 9.7 percent with M.A.s; 3.1 
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percent high school diploma; 3.1 percent A.A.), political affiliations (56.3 percent Democrat; 
19.4 percent Independent; 19.1 percent Republican; 5.2 percent other), and ideological affiliation 
(49.7 percent Liberal; 32.3 percent Moderate; 14.6 percent Conservative; and 3.5 percent other). 
The survey was split into three sections: baseline information, COVID-19, and 9/11. A full copy 
of the survey can be found in the Appendix.  
General information was collected in the baseline section for personal, emotional, and 
political demographics of participants which consisted of gender, age, citizenship (US/dual/non-
US), identity (student/working professional/other), education level, political party affiliation, 
ideological affiliation. The baseline section also included self-reports of political identity and 
approval during the past year, as well an emotional baseline for the past year. The purpose of this 
section was to collect a self-reported baseline to act as a control which could be compared to the 
responses regarding times of crisis.   
The COVID-19 section asked participants to answer questions regarding the pandemic 
with the response that most applied. It gathered information on emotional state, the effect of 
COVID-19 on one’s life, political approval, and identity during the crisis. The political approval 
for this section was split into two separate questions: how they believe President Trump is 
handling the situation, and how their opinion of Trump has changed, if at all. Identity asked what 
they most identified with during COVID-19: party, ideology, both party and ideology, or 
nationality. The question following this section asked respondents if they remember 9/11. If they 
answered that they did not remember 9/11, the survey stopped.  
The final section consisted of questions regarding 9/11. If followed the same structure of 
the COVID-19 section in asking emotional, political, and identity questions. It asked participants 
the same questions of self-reports of their emotional state, the effect of the attacks on their life, 
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how they believed President Bush handled the crisis, how their opinion of Bush changed, and 
what they most identified with during 9/11. However, given the significant time difference, this 
section also included questions of political party and ideology affiliation during 9/11 and their 
role as a student, working professional, or other. Response options were kept the same across the 
two sections; however, the option of “N/A (too young)” was added for questions regarding 9/11. 
This option was added to limit false reporting, as those who responded that they did remember 
9/11 might still have been too young to formulate political opinions.  
While the survey provided a large amount of data, it was not without flaws. First, the 
reliance on self-reports cannot guarantee that the responses were not affected by the individual’s 
perception of self and the questions. Additionally, while the questions across sections remained 
consistent, the retrospective nature of the section for 9/11 changes the context in which 
respondents evaluate their answers. After nearly a decade of additional political experiences and 
distance from the events, it is possible that the data received is different from how participants 
would have responded during 9/11. Lastly, due to the timeframe difference, the baseline 
questions did not help in analysis of 9/11 changes, as they establish a future baseline, so it exists 
solely in a comparative function. Specifically, the survey did not include a baseline question in 
the 9/11 section for feelings toward Bush prior to the events, only how opinion changed, which 
hindered my ability to assess reflection versus confirmation bias.  
Results  
The results for this paper were found utilizing RStudio software to code and run multiple 
regression analysis. The data was imported and coded by question, each response becoming its 
own variable. However, additional variables were added to further investigate the degree of 
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reflection. The variables of interest are those regarding emotion, reflection, identity, and 
memory. (Detailed variable coding can be found in Appendix II).  
Emotion was coded as the simple responses to how they felt, the effect of the crisis on the 
individual’s life given in their response, and the change in emotion from the baseline. Emotion 
was coded on a numerical scale of threat (-2), anxiety (-1), neutral (0), calm (1), and safe (2). 
This established the difference in emotion between the baseline and during COVID-19 as a 
function of becoming either more negative (change to threat or anxiety), more positive (change 
to calm or safe), and consistent neutral. Other equivalents across the two were not coded (NA), 
as they do not denote change.  
Variables relating to reflection were broken into different groups: general change in 
opinion, confirmation bias, and reflection with change of opinion. General change in opinion 
resulted from the lack of baseline for 9/11 political approval and applied mostly to regressions 
run for 9/11 data. Coding correlated directly with the response given to the question of how 
one’s opinion of the president changed. Given the baseline emotion for COVID-19, more 
variables could be created for that reflection. The first was confirmation bias which denoted 
whether or not the change in opinion of Trump (change in opinion = 1, no change = -1, neutral 
opinion = 0) was simply a bolstering of the reported opinion from before COVID-19. If they 
reported a negative opinion of Trump in the baseline and more negative opinion during COVID, 
a positive opinion in the baseline and more positive during COVID, or neutral to the baseline, the 
cognitive process was classified as confirmation bias.  
Reflection on the other hand was coded as a change in opinion which differed from the 
baseline report. This was differentiated on 4 levels: no change (-1), neutral opinion (0), 
confirmation bias (1), and reflection as a change to opposition (2). For example, if one reported a 
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positive view of Trump in the baseline, but indicated their view became more negative during 
COVID-19, this would demonstrate reflection, as it shows a reversal of opinion. 
To show the differentiation between System 1 and 2, numeric values were separated into 
negative, positive, and neutral. The negative value (-1) corresponds to those who indicate no 
change in opinion at all under new circumstances, indicating submission to implicit attitudes and 
beliefs. Taking into consideration the option for a neutral view of Trump in the baseline, a 
consistent neutral opinion is coded as 0. Reflection becomes notable in the positive numeric 
values of 1 and 2, indicating they did change their opinion from the baseline under the new 
circumstances of COVID-19. Anyone who changed their opinion to simply a more fortified 
version of their previous opinion was considered to have undergone confirmation bias, coded as 
(1). However, those who changed their opinion during COVID-19 to the opposite of their 
baseline were coded as (2) and considered to have undergone reflection of the highest degree.  
Variables for identity covered a large portion of the data including party and ideological 
affiliation, what one identifies most with, and the convergence of party and ideological 
affiliations. Apart from the last one, all codes were directly in line with answers to the 
corresponding question on the survey. The code for convergence was based on the general 
affiliation numerical scale of, for ideology, liberal (1), moderate (0), conservative (-1), other 
(NA). If one’s ideological affiliation matched their party affiliation (e.g. liberal/democrat, 
conservative/republican, independent/moderate), it was coded as 1. If they did not match, it was 
coded as 0. This process was repeated for data for 9/11.  
This was investigated further by creating a variable that expressed whether or not they 
identified with this converged affiliation. If they responded they identified most with both their 
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ideology and party during the crisis, it was coded as 1. If not, it was coded as 0. This process was 
completed for COVID-19 and 9/11 data. 
Lastly, memory of 9/11 was coded directly by response to the survey question as either 
did remember (1) or did not remember (0). Those who marked N/A (not born) were coded as 
NA.  
Results for Hypothesis 1: The emotion one feels during COVID-19 and 9/11 will affect one’s 
likelihood to engage in System 2 reflection. 
To test the first hypothesis, this study ran linear regression models with dependent 
variables of confirmation bias and reflection for COVID-19 and change of opinion for 9/11. (All 
regression models can be found in Appendix III). The model shows a significant negative 
correlation between emotion and reflection (p < .05), where an increase in 1 unit of emotion 
(toward calm/safe) causes a decrease in reflection of 0.11 units, toward confirmation bias. Also 
significant at the p < 0.1 level, are identity and view of Trump’s handling of COVID-19. Identity 
also has a negative relationship where an increase in 1 unit (toward converged party and 
ideology) correlates with a decrease in reflection (toward confirmation bias) by 0.08 units. 
Lastly, this test indicates a positive relationship between views of Trump’s handling of COVID-
19 and reflection. As an individual increases one unit toward positive views of Trump’s 
handling, their likelihood of reflection increases by 0.15 units.  
More specifically, a second regression was run with the dependent variable of 
confirmation bias to see, within reflection, what variables had the most effect on the decision to 
utilize new information to bolster previous beliefs. Included in this test were other independent 
variables of memory of 9/11, party and ideological affiliation, convergence of party and 
ideological affiliation, and one’s identity. The results of this test demonstrate four different levels 
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of significance for the independent variables. At a significance of p < .001, the test shows that 
emotion does have a significant effect on confirmation bias. As emotion increased one unit 
(toward feelings of calm and safety), likelihood of confirmation bias increased by 0.13 units. 
Also at this level, as party affiliation moved one unit closer to Democrat, likelihood of 
confirmation bias decreased by 0.37 units. The last independent variable significant at the p < 
.001 level is ideology, showing that as ideology moved one unit toward Liberal, likelihood of 
confirmation bias decreased by 0.22 units. Other significant variables were memory of 9/11 (p < 
.05), showing as memory of 9/11 increased by 1 unit, likelihood of confirmation bias increased 
by 0.21 units. What one chose to identify most with during COVID-19 was not significant; 
however, as one’s political identity converged (meaning their ideology and party lined up), 
confirmation bias increased by 0.31 units (p < .1).  
The test run for reflection during 9/11, as noted previously, can only show the effect of 
independent variables on general change in opinion surrounding President Bush. The results in 
this section denote an effect on one’s opinion becoming more negative (-1), not changing (0), 
more positive (1). A regression model was run with dependent variables of change in opinion on 
Bush and independent variables of emotion, effect of 9/11 on life, view of how Bush handled the 
crisis, what one identifies most with, and convergence of identity. 
This test shows a significant (p < .001) effect of view of how Bush handled 9/11 on 
change of opinion. As one’s opinion of President Bush increased by 1 unit, change of opinion 
increased by 0.49 units (more positive). That with which an individual identifies most also 
affected change of opinion during 9/11, as it increased 1 unit (toward both party and ideology), 
opinion change increased by 0.11 units, (more positive). Lastly, the perceived effect of 9/11 on 
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one’s life had a significant (p < 0.1) effect on change of opinion, where an increase of 1 unit in 
effect (toward positive) caused an increase of 0.16 in change of opinion (more positive).  
Results for Hypothesis 2: Partisanship will decrease when threat and anxiety increase during 
times of crisis. 
Building off of the results related to partisanship from the tests for Hypothesis 1, the 
following models focus on identity and how emotion and other independent variables affect 
whether or not one identifies with political identities, namely party, or a less partisan identity, 
like nationality. Beginning with COVID-19, the regression model outlined the effect of emotion, 
party, ideology, COVID-19 effect, and opinion of Trump’s handling of the crisis on identity 
affiliation. 
This test shows no correlation between identity and emotion, nor other independent 
variables, except for party affiliation. As party affiliation increases 1 unit (toward Democrat), 
identity increases by 0.25 units (toward a converged identity of both party and ideology). This is 
significant at the p < .05 level. Also significant at the p < .05 level is reflection. As reflection 
increases 1 unit, identity decreases 0.19 units toward nationality.  
An additional test regarding identity during COVID-19 was run to see what affects one’s 
change in identity, specifically toward nationality. In this case, the variables included are: 9/11 
memory, COVID emotion, whether the person changed their emotion from the baseline, and 
view of Trump’s handling of the issue. This test showed a significant (p < 0.1) effect of 9/11 
memory and emotion change. As memory increased (remembered 9/11) by 1 unit, changing their 
identity to nationality decreased by 0.19 units. For every 1 unit increase in emotion change (as 
emotions became more positive during COVID when compared to baseline), identifying with 
nationality decreased by 0.17 units. This test was run an additional time to replace the memory 
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variable with age and to include party. During this test, age had no statistical significance; 
however, the variable of party did. As the party variable increased 1 unit (toward Democrat), 
change in identity to nationality went down 0.13 units. In this second test, memory of 9/11 
remained significant, but change in emotion did not.  
The same identity regression model was run for the data for 9/11, finding significant 
effect for emotion (p < .05), change of opinion on Bush (p < .05), and view of Bush’s handling 
of the events (p < .01). As emotion increased 1 unit (toward calm and safety), identity increased 
0.20 units towards converged party/ideology identity. As opinion on Bush shifted 1 unit more 
positive, identity shifted .40 units toward converged identity. However, as opinion of Bush’s 
handling of 9/11 increased by 1 unit, identity decreased by 0.43 units (toward nationality).  
To investigate further the change in identity away from converged identity during 9/11, 
another regression was run to see what caused people to move to the lowest numerical value for 
identity––nationality. This test shows that in the decision to switch one’s identity to nationality––
as opposed to convergence, party, or ideology––emotion (p < .05) and view of Bush’s handling 
of the events (p < 0.1) had significance. As emotion increased by 1 unit (toward calm/safety), the 
change to nationality identity decreased by 0.13 units (did not identify with Nationality). As 
opinion of Bush’s handling increased by 1 unit, the change to nationality identity increased by 
0.14 units.  
The last two tests run for Hypothesis 2 focused on views of how the presidents handled 
each crisis, and how emotion and partisanship affect this. The first regression run details 
constituent opinions of Trump during COVID-19.  
This test shows that ideology is significant at the p < .001 level. An increase in one unit 
of ideology (away from moderate, toward conservative and liberal) correlates with a decrease in 
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evaluations of Trump’s handling of COVID-19. Additionally, party played a significant role in 
evaluation (p < .001), as an increase of 1 unit in party affiliation (away from independent toward 
Democrat and Republican) denotes a decrease in opinion on Trump’s handling by 0.33 units, 
toward not well. Lastly, this test confirms a significant positive relationship between emotion 
and evaluation (p < .001), where an increase in emotion (toward calm and safe) by 1 unit 
correlates with an increase in evaluation by 0.12 units, toward well.  
The same regression was repeated for 9/11 and views of Bush handling that crisis. The 
regression and results show an effect of ideology (p < .001), and identification with a converged 
identity (p < .01). When run again to assess data on 9/11, the test shows a significant relationship 
between ideology and evaluations of Bush’s handling of the events of 9/11. Significant at the p < 
.001 level, as ideology increases by 1 unit (away from moderate, toward conservative and 
liberal), evaluations of Bush decreased by 0.71 units. Also significant (p < .05), is whether or not 
people identified with a converged identity (both their party and ideology). As one’s identity 
converged (increased by 1 unit), evaluations of Bush increased by 0.30 units. During 9/11, 
emotion did not have a significant effect on President Bush evaluations.  
Results for Hypothesis 3: Memory of 9/11 will affect one’s emotional response to national 
crises. 
To test the effect of memory of 9/11 on the emotional response to COVID-19, yet another 
regression was run. This test confirmed the hypothesis that memory of 9/11 does have a 
significant effect on COVID-19 emotion (p < .01), but also confirms significant effect of the 
effect of COVID-19 on one’s life (p < .001) and one’s original opinion of Trump (p < .01). The 
regression shows that as memory increases 1 unit (they do remember 9/11), emotion regarding 
COVID-19 decreases (toward anxiety/threat) by 0.23 units. The most significant effect shows 
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that as the perceived effect increases 1 unit (toward positive effect), emotion increases by 0.39 
units (toward calm/safe). Lastly, the original view of Trump (within the past year) has an effect 
of a 1-unit increase (toward positive view) and correlates with an increase of 0.26 units in 
emotion (toward calm/safe). When run to specifically test for a correlation between COVID-19 
emotion and a feeling of threat during 9/11, the results showed no significant relationship. 
Looking back at tests run for earlier hypotheses, memory of 9/11 was also significant in 
confirmation bias, reflection and identity change to nationality during COVID-19. Again, a 
second test was run where age was substituted for memory to ensure the significance was not 
simply correlation. Age was insignificant, validating the effect of memory of 9/11 on COVID-19 
emotion. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper demonstrates a varying degree of support for the hypotheses and the effect of 
emotion on reflection and partisanship during crises. The research shows that emotion has a 
significant effect on reflection––namely, confirmation bias––during COVID-19, identity and 
identity change across COVID-19 and 9/11, and evaluations of political leaders during both 
crises. Emotion has no significant effect on general identity affiliation during COVID-19, nor 
changes in opinion on Bush during 9/11. The tests offer additional perspective into the effect of 
ideological and party affiliations, converged party-ideology identities, issue-based political 
evaluations, and memory. 
The first test run for Hypothesis 1 shows a clear effect of emotion on the process of 
reflection, confirming the hypothesis. When people feel anxious or threatened, as opposed to 
calm or safe, they are more likely to reflect on information regarding political situations, using it 
to come to new conclusions. Given that the process of reflection was based on changes to the 
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overall opinion of Trump, this correlation indicates that emotions play a significant role in how 
individuals evaluate their president. While the purpose of this paper is to provide analysis of data 
pertaining to national crises, this effect of emotion on reflection calls for more research into the 
effect different emotions can have on the ways in which constituents evaluate political leaders. 
Specifically, it would be beneficial for further investigations to study a wider range of emotions, 
and the effect each can have on political decision-making.   
Moreover, this test shows a correlation between both identity and opinion of Trump with 
reflection. These both have significant implications on political research and the evaluations 
made by constituents under certain circumstances and pressures. The first, identity, shows that 
increased partisanship––when party and ideology converge––leads to lower levels of reflection 
in the general public. This is particularly relevant to the growing literature on partisanship and 
polarization, as it pertains to their effect on evaluation and accountability of political elites. 
Lastly, despite the effect of polarization, the conclusions of this research do leave some hope for 
the ability of the public to thoroughly review and change opinions, as evaluations of Trump were 
significant for reflection. While emotion and partisanship play into evaluations of the president 
during COVID-19, the perception of how Trump is handling the crisis has a significant effect as 
well. Those who had a positive view of how Trump is handling COVID-19 were more likely to 
reflect (change their opinion), meaning, despite partisanship, the public is still able to evaluate 
political leaders based on policy and performance. 
The second test run for Hypothesis 1 establishes that emotion has a significant effect on 
confirmation bias. Higher levels of calm and safety increased the likelihood of confirmation bias 
in constituents. These results, in contrast with the first test, show how different emotions can 
instigate different cognitive engagement and decision-making in politics. Additionally, both 
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party and ideology were significant, demonstrating that Democrats and Liberals were less likely 
to engage in confirmation bias. This can possibly be attributed to the majority Republican and 
Conversative positions of power, and––given the polarization during COVID-19––the possibility 
that mainstream information regarding political situations would be biased towards Republican 
or Conservative viewpoints. As such, Democrats would be less likely to utilize this information 
to support previously held beliefs. However, as identity converged––as one identified as 
Democrat/Liberal or Republican/Conservative––confirmation bias increased, demonstrating the 
danger of polarization for political judgement. This test develops the concepts of confirmation 
bias and the specific variables that influence it; however, it exposes a necessity for further 
research on how confirmation bias relates to reflection. Specifically, this research lacks the 
capability to validate which parts of the brain, and consequently which Systems, are active 
during each process, leaving ample room for future investigations.  
The third test for Hypothesis 1 offered what perspective is available, given the data, for 
reflection during 9/11. While the questions shed light on perception of President Bush’s handling 
of the crisis and how opinion changed, as a retrospective section of the survey, there is no 
baseline for comparison. As such, the results cannot be split into the same categories as 
reflection for COVID-19 and only demonstrate overall change in opinion. The results show that 
how one viewed Bush, that with which an individual identifies, and the effect of 9/11 on one’s 
life have a significant effect on change in opinion during 9/11. While emotion did not have a 
significant effect, there was an increase in the number of people who felt threatened while a 
simultaneous mediation of opinions on the way Bush handled the crisis in comparison to 
Trump’s handling of COVID. This could possibly be attributed to the direction and ownership of 
the emotion. If during 9/11 the threat and anxiety were directed toward non-American political 
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actors (terrorists), this would reformulate the in-group/out-group to the “other” being outside the 
US, as opposed to the opposing party or president. Therefore, the emotion would not be directed 
toward the president nor interfere with one’s ability to evaluate a political leader. The theory of 
directional emotion requires more research, but it could have an impact on how political 
psychology approaches in/out-groups and reflection during times of heightened emotion.  
Results from tests regarding Hypothesis 2 are particularly relevant in discussions of 
partisanship, not only during each crisis, but how it has changed. The tests show that what one 
identifies with most during COVID-19 is influenced by party affiliation and reflection. As one 
becomes more affiliated with the Democratic Party, the likelihood that they identified with both 
their ideology and party increased. Given the current divides within the Republican party and the 
transformations it has undergone over the past four years, it is understandable that identity with 
the party would decrease. Further, with a Republican president in office at the time that this 
survey was given, it is possible that Democrats might not believe that they can find support from 
the nation, and so would look more toward their party and ideology than their nationality. 
Additionally, as reflection increased, identity shifted away from partisan, converged identity and 
toward nationality, supporting the theory that higher levels of reflection and cognitive thought in 
politics provide a means of combating polarization. However, while reflection was possible and 
had a significant effect on identity change during COVID-19, the number of people engaging in 
this process (13) were few, necessitating further research to lend credibility to these findings. 
The comparison between this test and identity during 9/11 is very telling of the changes 
in the political atmosphere over the past twenty years. During 9/11, identity was affected by 
emotion, views on how Bush handled it, and one’s change in opinion about Bush. During 9/11, 
party and ideology affiliations had no significant effect on identity. These results show that 
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issue-based evaluations carried more weight than political affiliations under the Bush 
administration. While the reasons for this change are beyond the scope of this paper, they are 
crucial for characterizing the current political climate and necessitate further research.  
The results of these tests do, however, reveal important factors in an individual’s decision 
to change his/her identity to nationality. Here, emotion does have an effect on partisanship, in 
that those whose emotional state changed between the baseline and COVID-19 toward calm and 
safety were less likely to identify with nationality. Meaning, as threat and anxiety increase, so 
too did nationality as a main identifying feature. The same emotional divide is found during 
9/11, indicating a trend of positive correlation between feelings of threat/anxiety and identifying 
with nationality during crises. That said, evaluation of Bush and his performance is significant 
for 9/11 identity, while evaluation of Trump is not during COVID-19. This could be attributed to 
the increase in partisanship and polarization that decreased reflection and change of opinion 
during COVID-19. This is illuminated by the inclusion of the significance of party on identity 
change to nationality under Trump. In this test, Republicans were more likely to change their 
identity under COVID-19 to their nationality. Change in identity along party lines, specifically 
the party in power, maintains the argument of increasing partisanship. It also raises questions 
about the influence of rhetoric from the party in power and how increased polarization affects 
who that reaches. Lastly, identifying with nationality was affected by memory of 9/11, which 
supports the hypothesis that reflective and comparative memory play an influential role in 
political decision-making. While this is not conclusive evidence, it starts a preliminary 
conversation that people may be more likely, during crisis and possibly beyond, to compare 
previous political experiences when deciding whether or not to identify with their party/ideology.  
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More evidence of the potential effect of increased polarization/partisanship can be seen in 
the evaluations of the presidents at the time of crises. During COVID-19, opinions on how 
Trump is handling the situation are influenced significantly by emotion, party, and ideology. 
This shows a similar relationship between emotion and political leaders to the one mentioned 
above, where party cues and political affiliation are strong indicators of how we will evaluate 
political elites. However, there may be room to change that and transcend those boundaries 
through positive emotion associations. The biggest discrepancy between the two tests run for 
presidential evaluation is the directional difference of the effect of emotion during the crises. 
During COVID-19, emotion has a significant positive correlation with positive views of Trump’s 
handling of the crisis. As people’s feelings of calm and safety increase, they are more likely to 
hold positive views of the president. However, during 9/11, emotion had no significant impact on 
evaluations of Bush.  
It is possible that this could be a result of the increase in effect of party affiliation during 
COVID-19, as opposed to 9/11. Ideology remains significant across the two crises; however, 
party only becomes significant during COVID-19. The simultaneous increase in the effect of 
party and emotion could suggest a significant correlation between the increase in partisanship 
and positive emotion. This seems to be a newer possibility, as during 9/11 evaluations of Bush 
were not affected at all by emotion nor party and relied solely on ideological affiliation. What 
does this say about the political landscape? The implication of such a correlation could have a 
great impact on how presidents manipulate constituent emotion during times of heightened 
partisanship. If political leaders can utilize or aggravate polarization or emotion of the public, 
they have the potential to also manipulate their evaluations of issue-based efforts and actions. 
Additionally, the significance of identifying with a converged affiliation (both party and 
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ideology) during 9/11 shows that, even under times of lower polarization or party affiliation, the 
lack of cross-cutting affiliations subjects constituents to the same possible manipulation. These 
tests show that the political landscape is changing and the increase in partisanship and 
polarization may have also brought an increase in the potential for emotional affect in politics.  
While this paper makes strides in the effort to expand the literature on reflection and 
uncover the role of emotion and partisanship in this process within political psychology, there is 
still research to be done. This analysis utilizes data from a survey with a limited scope, focusing 
solely on self-reports during COVID-19 and retrospective data concerning 9/11. Without a 
baseline for 9/11 emotion and opinion, the ability to perform a comprehensive comparison 
between the crises is hindered. The potential to look at existing data from research done on 
emotion during 9/11 could have been useful when looking at changes in opinion during 9/11 and 
remains a possibility for future investigations. Additionally, reliance on self-reports leaves room 
for the possibility of projection and manipulation of answers to meet personal goals of 
respondents. In order to combat this, repeating the research utilizing technologically measured 
emotional states and implicit bias would provide more accurate results. As noted earlier, the 
survey consists of higher female participation, so, as to assure this did not skew results, a wider 
range of participants is also crucial for further research. To better understand the intersection of 
emotion and reflection in politics, research into other heightened and non-heightened emotional 
time frames in politics is necessary. This paper provides a small steppingstone in the 
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Appendix I - Survey 
GOV450 Final Research Project  
The goal of this survey is to provide data for my final research project in GOV450: Political Psychology. All responses are 
anonymous.  
 
1) By selecting yes below, you consent to the anonymous replication of the results of this survey for written and verbal 
presentation. 
a) Yes  
Demographics: 
For each of the following questions, please select the 
answer that most applies. 
1) Gender 









f) 60 or older 
3) I am a US citizen 
a) Yes (only US) 
b) Yes (dual-citizenship) 
c) No 
4) I identify most as 
a) Student 
b) Working Professional 
c) Other 
5) Education level 
a) High School Diploma 
b) Some college 
c) Associate’s Degree 
d) Bachelor’s Degree 
e) Master’s Degree 
f) Professional Degree 
g) Doctoral Degree  
6) Political Party Affiliation  









8) Within the past year, my overall view of 
President Trump has been mostly: 
a) Positive 
b) Negative  
c) Neutral 
9) Within the past year, I identified most with 
a) My political party 
(Democrat/Republican/Independent/Ot
her) 
b) My ideology 
(Liberal/Conservative/Moderate/Other) 
c) Both ideology and party 
d) My nationality (American) 
e) My nationality (non-American) 









For each of the following questions, please select the 
answer that most applies. 










d) Not at all 
3) During COVID-19, I identify most with 
a) My party 
(Democrat/Republican/Independent/Ot
her) 
b) My ideology 
(Liberal/Conservative/Moderate/Other) 
c) Both my party and ideology 
d) My nationality (American) 
e) My nationality (non-American) 
4) I think President Trump has handled/is handling 
COVID-19 
a) Well 
b) Not well 
c) Neutrally 
d) I don’t have an opinion 
5) In the wake of COVID-19, my opinion of 
President Trump has become 
a) More positive 
b) More negative 
c) My opinion has not changed 
d) I don't have an opinion 
9/11: 
For each of the following questions, please select the 
answer that most applies. 
 
1) I remember 9/11* 
a) Yes  
b) No 
c) N/A (not born) 
 
*survey ends for those who responded No or N/A (not 
born)  
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For each of the following questions, please select the 
answer that most applies. 
1) During 9/11, I was  
a) Student (N-8th grade) 
b) Student (9-12th grade) 
c) Student (post 12th grade) 
d) Working professional 
e) Other 










d) Not at all 





e) N/A (I was too young) 





e) N/A (I was too young) 
6) During 9/11, I identified most with 
a) My party 
(Democrat/Republican/Independent/Ot
her) 
b) My ideology 
(Liberal/Conservative/Moderate/Other) 
c) Both my party and ideology 
d) My nationality (American) 
e) My nationality (non-American) 
f) N/A (I was too young) 
7) I think President Bush handled 9/11 
a) Well 
b) Not well 
c) Neutrally 
d) I didn’t have an opinion 
8) In the wake of 9/11, my opinion of President 
Bush became 
a) More positive 
b) More negative 
c) My opinion did not change 
d) I didn’t have an opinion
 
Appendix II- Coded Variables 
GOV450data1 – data set 
Emotion: 
COVIDemo1 = emotion one felt during COVID 
nine11emo1 = emotion one felt during 9/11 
COVIDeffect1 = the effect of COVID on one’s life 
nine11effect1 = the effect of 9/11 on one’s life 
COVIDemochng2 = the change in one’s reported emotion during COVID from baseline 
Change from baseline: 
GOV450data1$COVIDemochng2 <- NA 
GOV450data1$COVIDemochng2[GOV450data1$EmoBase1 < 0 & GOV450data1$COVIDemo1 > 0] <- 1  
GOV450data1$COVIDemochng2[GOV450data1$EmoBase1 < 0 & GOV450data1$COVIDemo1 == 0] <- 1  
GOV450data1$COVIDemochng2[GOV450data1$EmoBase1 == 0 & GOV450data1$COVIDemo1 > 0 ] <- 1    
GOV450data1$COVIDemochng2[GOV450data1$EmoBase1 == 0 & GOV450data1$COVIDemo1 < 0] <- -1   
GOV450data1$COVIDemochng2[GOV450data1$EmoBase1 > 0 & GOV450data1$COVIDemo1 < 0] <- -1    
GOV450data1$COVIDemochng2[GOV450data1$EmoBase1 > 0 & GOV450data1$COVIDemo1 == 0] <- -1 
GOV450data1$COVIDemochng2[GOV450data1$EmoBase1 == 0 & GOV450data1$COVIDemo1 == 0] <- 0 
Reflection: 
COVIDtrumpchng = how one’s opinion of Trump changed during COVID (+, -, NA) 
nine11bushchng = how one’s opinion of Bush changed during 9/11 (+, _, NA) 
COVIDturmpconbias = confirmation bias (no change in opinion of Trump during COVID) 
GOV450data1$COVIDtrumpconbias <- NA 
GOV450data1$COVIDtrumpconbias[GOV450data1$Trumpbase1 == 1 & GOV450data1$COVIDtrumpchng == 1] <-1 
GOV450data1$COVIDtrumpconbias[GOV450data1$Trumpbase1 == -1 & GOV450data1$COVIDtrumpchng == -1]< -1   
GOV450data1$COVIDtrumpconbias[GOV450data1$Trumpbase1 == 0] <- 0 
COVIDreflect2 = reflection with change of opinion 
GOV450data1$COVIDreflect2 <- NA 
GOV450data1$COVIDreflect2[GOV450data1$Trumpbase1 == -1 & GOV450data1$COVIDtrumpchng == 1] <- 2   
GOV450data1$COVIDreflect2[GOV450data1$Trumpbase1 == 0 & GOV450data1$COVIDtrumpchng == 1] <- 2   
GOV450data1$COVIDreflect2[GOV450data1$Trumpbase1 == 0 & GOV450data1$COVIDtrumpchng == -1] <- 1  
GOV450data1$COVIDreflect2[GOV450data1$Trumpbase1 == 1 & GOV450data1$COVIDtrumpchng == -1] <- 1  
GOV450data1$COVIDreflect2[GOV450data1$Trumpbase1 == GOV450data1$COVIDtrumpchng] <-  -1  
GOV450data1$COVIDreflect2[GOV450data1$COVIDtrumpchng == 0] <- 0  
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Identity:  
Party = Party affiliation baseline (over the past year) 
nine11party1 = Party affiliation during 9/11 
Ideo1 = Ideological affiliation baseline (over the past year) 
nine11ideo1 = Ideological affiliation during 9/11 
Polidentity1 = with what one identifies most baseline (over the past year) 
COVIDidentity1 = with what one identifies most during COVID 
Nine11polidentity1 = with what one identified most during 9/11 
ideo.party.c.convrg = onvergence of party and ideological affiliation during COVID 
GOV450data1$ideo.party.c.cnvrg <- NA 
GOV450data1$ideo.party.c.cnvrg[GOV450data1$Ideo1 ==  GOV450data1$Party1] <- 1 
GOV450data1$ideo.party.c.cnvrg[GOV450data1$Ideo1 !=  GOV450data1$Party1] <- 0 
ideo.party.n.cnvrg = convergence of party and ideological affiliation during 9/11 
ideo.party.c.id = whether or not one identified with their converged party/ideology most during COVID 
ideo.party.n.id = whether or not one identified with their converged party/ideology most during 9/11 
GOV450data1$ideo.party.n.id <- NA 
GOV450data1$ideo.party.n.id[GOV450data1$nine11identity1 == 3 ] <- 1 
GOV450data1$ideo.party.n.id[GOV450data1$nine11identity1 != 3] <- 0 
 
Appendix III- Regression Models 
Hypothesis 1: 
Reflection (COVID): 
olsH4.4 <- lm(GOV450data1$COVIDreflect2~ GOV450data1$COVIDemo1 + GOV450data1$COVIDidentity1 + 
GOV450data1$Party1  + GOV450data1$Ideo1 + GOV450data1$COVIDtrump1  + GOV450data1$nine11mem1, data 
= GOV450data1) 
 
Confirmation bias (COVID): 
olsH4.c5 <- lm(GOV450data1$COVIDtrumpconbias ~ GOV450data1$nine11mem1 + GOV450data1$COVIDemo1 
+GOV450data1$COVIDidentity1 + GOV450data1$Party1 + GOV450data1$ideo.party.c.id +GOV450data1$Ideo1, 
data = GOV450data1) 
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olsH4.3 <- lm(GOV450data1$nine11bushchng~ GOV450data1$nine11emo1 + GOV450data1$nine11effect1 + 




Identity affiliation (COVID): 
olsH2.c <- lm(GOV450data1$COVIDidentity1~ GOV450data1$COVIDreflect2+ GOV450data1$COVIDemo1 + 
GOV450data1$Party1 + GOV450data1$Ideo1 + GOV450data1$COVIDeffect1  + GOV450data1$COVIDtrump1, 
data = GOV450data1) 
 
Change in identity towards nationality (COVID): 
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olsH2.3 <- lm(GOV450data1$COVIDidchng2nat ~  GOV450data1$nine11mem1 +GOV450data1$COVIDemochng2 + 
GOV450data1$COVIDemo1  + GOV450data1$COVIDtrump1, data = GOV450data1) 
 
Identity affiliation (9/11)): 
olsH2.7 <- lm(GOV450data1$nine11polidentity1 ~ GOV450data1$nine11emo1 + GOV450data1$nine11reflect1 + 
GOV450data1$bush1, data = GOV450data1) 
 
Change in identity towards nationality (9/11): 
olsH2.6 <- lm(GOV450data1$nine11idchng2nat ~  GOV450data1$nine11party1+ GOV450data1$nine11emo1  + 
GOV450data1$nine11reflect1 + GOV450data1$bush1, data = GOV450data1) 
 
Opinion of Trump (COVID): 
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olsH6.2 <- lm(GOV450data1$COVIDtrump1 ~GOV450data1$Ideo1+ GOV450data1$Party1+ 
GOV450data1$COVIDemo1+ GOV450data1$ideo.party.c.cnvrg + GOV450data1$ideo.party.c.id, data = 
GOV450data1) 
 
Opinion of Bush (9/11): 
olsH6.5 <- lm(GOV450data1$bush1~ GOV450data1$nine11party1+ GOV450data1$nine11ideo1 + 





Effect of memory of 9/11 on emotion during COVID: 
olsH5 <- lm(GOV450data1$COVIDemo1 ~ GOV450data1$nine11mem1 + GOV450data1$COVIDeffect1 + 
GOV450data1$Party1 +GOV450data1$Ideo1 + GOV450data1$Trumpbase1, data = GOV450data1) 
 
29
Curry: COVID-19 and 9/11





1 David J. Ciuk, "Assessing the Contextual Stability of Moral Foundations: Evidence from a 
Survey Experiment," Sage Journal 5, no. 2 (June 20, 2018): 1-9,1. 
2 Ciuk, 1-2. & Xiaoli Nan, "Emotional Responses to Televised PSAs and Their Influence on 
Persuasion: An Investigation of the Moderating Role of Faith in Intuition," Communications 
Studies 60, no. 5 (October 27, 2009): 426-442, 430, 
3Anthony G. Greenwald and Calvin K. Lai, "Implicit Social Cognition," Annual Review of 
Psychology 71 (October 22, 2019): 419-445, 428; Huntsinger, Jeffery R. "Mood and Trust in 
Intuition Interactively Orchestrate Correspondence between Implicit and Explicit Attitudes." 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 37, no. 9 (September 1, 2011): 1245-58. & Nan, 427. 
4 Adam L. Alter et al., " intuition: Overcoming Metacognitive Difficulty Activates Analytic 
Reasoning," Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 136, no. 4 (2007): 567-76, 569. & 
Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking Fast and Slow. Unabridged ed. Read by Patrick Egan. Penguin 
Random House Audio Publishing Group, 2011. Audiobook. 
5  Shawn C. Marsh, "Lens of Implicit Bias," editorial, National Council of Juvenile and Family 
Court Judges, last modified 2009, accessed January 28, 2021: 16-19, 17.  
6  Kevin Arceneaux and Ryan J. Vander Wielen, Taming Intuition: How Reflection Minimizes 
Partisan Reasoning and Promotes Democratic Accountability (Cambridge, United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), digital file, 13. & Kristen D. Deppe et al., "Reflective 
Liberals and Intuitive Conservatives: A Look at the Cognitive Reflection Test and 
Ideology.," Judgment and Decision Making, 10, no. 4 (July 2015): 314-31, 314-315. 
7 Arceneaux, K., & Vander Wielen, R. J., 21-22. 
8 Ibid., 25-26. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Arceneaux & Vander Wielen, 37 & Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in 
Mass Publics (1964)," Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 18, nos. 1-3 
(2006): 206-61, 18;23;54. 
11 Arceneaux, K., & Vander Wielen, R. J., 30-31; 44. 
12 Ibid., 44. 
13 James E. Campbell, Polarized: Making Sense of a Divided America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2018), 1-3. & Marc A. Sennewald, Kenneth L. Manning, and Robert A. Carp, 
"The Polarization of the Judiciary," Party Politics 23, no. 6 (November 2017): 657-65, 664. 
14 Loenie Huddy, Lilliana Mason, and Lene Aarøe, "Expressive Partisanship: Campaign 
Involvement, Political Emotion, and Partisan Identity," American Political Science Review 109, 
no. 1 (March 3, 2015): 1-17, 3-4; George E. Marcus, W. Russell Neuman, and Michael 
MacKuen, Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2000), 27-28; 58 & Luiz Pessoa, "On the Relationship between Emotion and Cognition," Nature 
Reviews Neuroscience 9 (February 2008): 148-158; 148-150. 
15 Todd, Rebecca M., Vladimir Miskovic, Junichi Chikazoe, and Adam K. Anderson. "Emotional 
Objectivity: Neural Representations of Emotions and Their Interaction with Cognition." Annual 
Review of Psychology 71:25-48, 27; 34-36; 42-43. & Pessoa, L., 148-150; 152-154 
16 Marcus, G. E., Neuman, W. R., & MacKuen, M., 47-49; 69; Todd, R. M., Miskovic, V., 
Chikazoe, J., & Anderson, A. K., 26-28. & Pessoa, L., 154-156. 
30




17 Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking Fast and Slow. Unabridged ed. Read by Patrick Egan. Penguin 
Random House Audio Publishing Group, 2011. Audiobook, 2 hr., 6 min. 
18 Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking Fast and Slow. Unabridged ed. Read by Patrick Egan. Penguin 
Random House Audio Publishing Group, 2011. Audiobook, 3 hr., 16 min. 
19 Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking Fast and Slow. Unabridged ed. Read by Patrick Egan. Penguin 
Random House Audio Publishing Group, 2011. Audiobook, 3 hr., 50 min. 
20 Fauci, Anthony S., H. Clifford Lane, and Robert R. Redfield. "Covid-19 — Navigating the 
Uncharted." The New England Journal of Medicine, March 26, 2020, 1268-69.; Mainiero, Lisa 
A., and Donald E. Gibson. "Managing Employee Trauma: Dealing with the Emotional Fallout 
from 9-11." Academy of Management Executive 17, no. 3 (2003): 130-43, 130-131. PDF. 
& Hsu, H. Y., Vásquez, B. E., & McDowall, D. (2019). A deadlier post-9/11 terrorism landscape 
for the USA abroad: a quasi-experimental study of backlash effects of terrorism prevention. 
Journal of Experimental Criminology, 607-23, 619-621. 
21 Arceneaux, K., & Vander Wielen, R. J., 22; 44-45. & Marcus, G. E., Neuman, W. R., & 
MacKuen, M., 53; 62; 69. 
22 Fauci, A. S., 1268-69.  
23 Mainiero, L. & Gibson, D. E., 131-133.  
24 Todd, R. M., Miskovic, V., Chikazoe, J., & Anderson, A. K., 34-39. 
25 Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking Fast and Slow. Unabridged ed. Read by Patrick Egan. Penguin 
Random House Audio Publishing Group, 2011. Audiobook, 2 hr., 6 min. 
26 Ibid., 39. 
27 Arceneaux, K., & Vander Wielen, R. J., 21-22; Todd, R. M., Miskovic, V., Chikazoe, J., & 
Anderson, A. K., 26-28 & Pessoa, L., 148–150; 152–154 
28 Marcus, G. E., Neuman, W. R., & MacKuen, M., 53;62;69. 
29 Weeks, Brian E. "Emotions, Partisanship, and Misperceptions: How Anger and Anxiety 
Moderate the Effect of Partisan Bias on Susceptibility to Political Misinformation." Journal of 
Communications 65, no. 4 (June 19, 2015): 699–719, 701–704. & Huddy, Leonie, and Lilliana 
Mason. "Heated Campaign Politics: An Intergroup Conflict Model of Partisan Emotions." Paper 
presented at American Political Science Association, Boston, MA, August 28-31, 2008:1–49, 5–
8. 
30 Weeks, B. E., 704. 
31 Ho, Cyrus SH, Cornelia YI Chee, and Roger CM Ho. "Mental Health Strategies to Combat the 
Psychological Impact of COVID-19 beyond Paranoia and Panic." Academy of Medicine 







Curry: COVID-19 and 9/11
Published by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository,
